1919 as watershed?: the Yokohama Specie Bank and HSBC in China by Horesh, Niv
Horesh, Niv (2014) 1919 as watershed?: the Yokohama 
Specie Bank and HSBC in China. In: Asian imperial 
banking history. Banking, money and international 
finance . Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 53-70. ISBN 
9781848935518 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/32353/1/HORESH%20HSBC%2029%20mars%202013%28a
%29.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the University of Nottingham End User licence and may 
be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
1 
 
1919 As Watershed ? The Yokohama Specie Bank and HSBC in 
China 
 
Niv Horesh 
University of Western Sydney, Australia 
Email: n.horesh@uws.edu.au 
  
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last three decades, a considerable body of English-language academic work 
KDVVKHGPXFKOLJKWRQ-DSDQ¶VHPSLUH-building project in Greater China during the 
first half of the twentieth century. At the same time, Japanese-language studies of the 
FRXQWU\¶VSUH-war financial history have also grown in leaps and bounds. Yet, to date, 
neither body of literature seems to have fully examined what might appear to the 
naked eye as one of the critical pre-war junctures, where Japanese financial history 
converged on imperial policy and Chinese nationalist responses thereto.1 This paper 
will therefore aim to fill part of the gap by examining how the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, arguably the backbone of Japanese finance in China Proper, modelled itself on 
the British privately-run Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC, 
established in 1865), insofar as monetary emissions were concerned, and how both 
banks were was affected by Chinese anti-foreign boycotts throughout the pre-war era 
(1842±1937). 
 
It is crucial to stress right at the outset that the following passages will pursue the 
interplay between finance and empire through the prism of overseas bank note 
circulation figures²a non-metropolitan prism not commonly employed in the 
pertinent literature. If anything, scholars have so far tended to focus on the impact of 
Chinese boycotts on Japanese manufacturing firms in the mid-1920s or later. Much 
less has been published on the fate of Japanese banks in China during that period. 
Moreover, to my knowledge no study in English, Japanese or Chinese specifically 
examined how Japanese banks fared in the Chinese market through the famous anti-
Japanese boycott that broke out on 4 May 1919, and is commonly known nowadays 
as the May Fourth (Wusi in Chinese) Movement. It is therefore hoped that this 
paper²particularly when read in conjunction with recent ground-breaking studies by 
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Smethurst, Metzler, Taira and Schiltz²might lead to a more complete understanding 
of the monetary mind-VHWEHKLQG-DSDQ¶VFRORQLDOSROLF\2 
 
To anticipate the conclusions: this paper argues that the Wusi boycott dealt a severe 
blow to the Yokohama Specie Bank¶VQRWHLVVXHLQ6KDQJKDLLQ. However, the 
longer-term effects of that boycott underscore demand-side pressures that could 
valuably tell us much more about the rising tide of nationalist sentiments in China 
WKDQWKH\VXJJHVWDµPRUWDO¶WKUHDWWREDQN¶VRYHUDOORSHUDWLRQVLQpre-war East Asia. 
This is primarily because YSB banknote issuance in China Proper was limited both in 
terms of its share of total YSB liabilities and in terms of its volume compared with 
Japanese colonial bank circulation volumes elsewhere. In short, Yokohama Specie 
Bank  EDQNQRWHVLQ&KLQDZHUHDPHDQVWRDQHQGDµPDQDJHGFXUUHQF\¶LQLWLDOO\
designed to support more important objectives like the amassing of local silver 
deposits and the facilitation of trade between Manchuria and China Proper.3  
 
The remaining five sections in this paper are organized as follows. The second section 
will explore the circumstances which led to the establishment of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank , and trace its China operations until 1919 with particular emphasis on 
banknote issuance. The third section will contextualize banknote issuance within 
more important Yokohama Specie Bank  business ends. It will place particular 
HPSKDVLVRQWKHEDQN¶VGHSRVLW-base as compared with other foreign and local banks 
operating in China. The fourth section will examine in detail the impact of the Wusi 
XSKHDYDORQWKHEDQN¶VRYHUDOORSHUDWLRQVDQGFRPSDUHLWVSHUIRUPDQFHGXULQJWKLV
period with other phases of anti-foreign agitation in China during the 1920s and 
1930s. The final section will aim to isolate the net effect of the Wusi boycott from 
non-political factors that may have also impinged on circulation volumes that year. 
Finally, the Conclusion will set out what may be the historic significance of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank¶VEDQNQRWHLVVXDQFHLQ&KLQD3URSHUDJDLQVWWKHODUJHU
backdrop of Japanese colonial policy, and in the light of what is known about the 
performance of other foreign banks operating in pre-war China.   
 
The Yokohama Specie Bank before 1919 
 
First envisioned by the renowned Meiji intellectual, Fukuzawa Yukichi, and modelled 
on the HSBC charter, the Yokohama Specie Bank was set up in 1880, two years 
before WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI-DSDQ¶VOHQGHURIODst resort, the Bank of Japan. In the 
1870s, a large number of Japanese joint-stock banks had been authorized to issue 
notes domestically, but the Japanese government rejected the Yokohama Specie 
%DQN¶VSUHOLPLQDU\UHTXHVWWREHDOORZHGWRLVVXHSDSHUPRQH\ within Japan itself. 
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Instead, finance minister Matsukata worked to create a central bank, the Bank of 
Japan, modelled on that of Belgium, a European economic latecomer whose 
specialized bank of issue (Banque Nationale de Belgique, established in 1850) was 
strictly state-run.4 At the same time, the Yokohama Specie Bank (hereafter YSB) was 
tasked with banknote issuance in China, which was then one of a few nominally-
sovereign countries where new foreign privately-run banks like HSBC could exercise 
extra-territorial privileges, and issue notes with the approval of their home 
governments.5   
 
To fully appreciate the circumstances in which the YSB was conceived it sould be 
recalled that foreign bank note issuance in China Proper had only taken off in the 
early twentieth century because of a deep-seated, popular suspicion of fiduciary 
money there hitherto. Back in the 1870s, when a Japanese overseas bank along the 
lines of HSBC was first broached, Japan itself was still forced to abide by extra-
territoriality which allowed for foreign bank note issuance on its very own soil. Yet, 
XQOLNHLPSHULDO&KLQD¶VEXUHDXFUDWV²ZKRZHUHVXEMHFWHGWRVLPLODUµXQHTXDOWUHDWLHV¶
with the West but began opposing foreign bank note issuance only at the turn of the 
twentieth century²JDSDQ¶V0HLMLUHIRUPHUVVRXJKWWRFXUWDLOIRUHLJQEDQNVDVHDUO\DV
the 1870s, when foreign (mostly British) note circulation volumes were still 
negligible.6    
 
The British banks, on their part, were not encouraged at first by the low circulation 
volumes of their fiduciary notes in China and Japan. Because of the sunken printing 
costs of these notes, and a one-third bullion reserve requirement imposed by the 
British Treasury against notes outstanding, the future viability of note issuance looked 
uncertain compared with more profitable business like issuing exchange bills. On 21 
2FWREHU+6%&¶V6KDQJKDLEUDQFKPDQDJHU'DYLG0F/HDQVXJJHVWHGWR
senior colleague James Greig, for example, that reserve requirements would have to 
be made malleable if the note issue were to sustain itself:7  
 
[set quote]I should say it is hardly worthwhile continuing the issue of notes at Shanghai²the amount 
RXWVWDQGLQJWKHUHLVVRVPDOOLWZRQ¶WSD\LI\RXKDYHWRNHHSRIWKHYDOXH>DVUHVHUYH@LQ\RXU
treasury. [It is] a question whether it will pay to continue the issue in Yokohama. If you keep a third of 
the value then there is no necessity for your keeping so large an amount of your current accounts idle. 
Suppose Japan and yourself have 25 lacs of notes out, $833,000 would be 1/3 and if you kept 3 or 4 
lacs more for current accounts this would be sufficient idle cash, the day has now arrived when you can 
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work more closely being in daily communication by wire with us all and in a position to raise a lac or 
two when hard pressed. Of course when you happen to be so low in cash you would take care to advise 
the Branches not to draw large amounts upon you. In addition to drawing by wire I suppose you have 
always a lot of bills receivable falling due so that I think you run very little risk in working as closely 
as I suggest.[end quote][2] 
0F/HDQ¶VSURJQRVLVVKRXOGDOVREHUHDGDJDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRIHDUO\-0HLML-DSDQ¶V
efforts to curb foreign note circulation domestically, whilst envisioning the very same 
property as part of its own future exchange bank operations. (We know this because 
of concerns publicly raised within the British expatriate community in China and 
-DSDQ¶VWUHDW\-ports.) For example, on 1 July 1876, the British-run Shanghai daily 
North-China Herald reported apprehensively from Yokohama that8  
 
>VHWTXRWH@«>7@KH-DSDQHVHJRYHUQPHQWVWLOOSXUVXHWKHLUVKRUW-sighted policy with respect to foreign 
bank-notes. In the Imperial Government Telegraph Office an announcement, dated 10th ult., is posted 
up [to] the effect that from and after that date no foreign bank-notes would be received in payment of 
telegrams. The Custom House Authorities also refuse to receive foreign notes in payment of 
duties.[end quote] 
 
As these measures were put in place, and as foreign note issuance on Japanese soil 
ZDVGLPLQLVKLQJ-DSDQ¶VRZQH[FKDQJHEDQNZDVEHLQJIOHVKHGRXW7KH<6%ZDV
first endowed with a paid-up capital of ¥ 3 million, of which 1 million was in the form 
of specie forwarded by the Japanese Treasury, and the other ¥ 2 million represented 
private equity. Thus, it was not a state-run colonial bank in the full sense of the word 
but, rather, a semi-official bank much like HSBC with a unique stated mission of 
IDFLOLWDWLQJ-DSDQ¶VRYHUVHDVWUDGH,PSOLFLWO\LWZDVH[SHFWHGWRplay a pivotal role in 
-DSDQ¶VORQJHU-term mercantilist exercise: the accumulation of foreign-currency 
reserves, which eventually allowed Japan in 1897 to move off the silver standard and 
to re-EDVHWKH\HQRQJROG7KHDELOLW\WRPDLQWDLQWKH\HQ¶VFRQYHrtibility to gold 
was ultimately achieved in no small measure thanks to the colossal war indemnities 
Japan had been able to extract from China in 1896, and the flotation of Japanese 
government bonds at the London stock exchange.9   
 
The first China branch of the YSB was opened in Shanghai as early as 1893 but it was 
not until 1902 that the bank started issuing notes on the Mainland²first in Shanghai, 
Niuzhuang (Yingkou), and then in Tianjin. The reason behind this time-lag has to do 
with the fact that Japan greatly depended on London finance for the purchase of 
Western machinery at the turn of the century, and was therefore cautious not be seen 
as a competitor of Western financial institutions in China.10 It was only later that the 
YSB also started issuing silver-denominated notes in Beijing (1910), Qingdao (1915), 
Hankou (1917), Jinan (1920) and Harbin (1921). Overall, the bank issued more than 
88 different types of note on Chinese soil primarily in tael and silver-dollar 
denominations, as well as smaller volumes of gold-yen notes in Dairen, Liaodong 
peninsula (as of 1913).11  
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$V7DEOHEHORZFOHDUO\VKRZVLWZDVWKH4LQJ'\QDVW\¶VGRZQIDOOLQDQGWKH
attendant financial meltdown in the Chinese-run banking sector that elevated the 
<6%¶VFLUFXODWLRQYROXmes in China Proper.12 Even so, higher demand for YSB notes 
in China Proper throughout the early 1910s translated into lower circulation volumes 
in the Japanese sphere of influence across north-east China. This was partly because 
the YSB total fiduciary issXHDWWKHWLPHZDVFDSSHGE\WKHEDQN¶VFKDUWHUZKLFKZDV
similar to the one that the British Colonial Office had imposed on HSBC.13  
 
Table 1 - YSB Note Circulation in China Proper (Excluding Manchuria) versus YSB 
Total Note Circulation, 1906±1912 Year end 
 
Unit: 10,000 Silver $  
Year Shanghai Tianjin  Beijing  TOTAL China 
Proper 
as % of 
Total YSB 
Circulation 
1906 144 41.2 - 752.8 24.6 
1907 133.8 42.2 - 619.5 28.4 
1908 108.3 49.2 - 417.2 37.7 
1909 81 47.1 - 292.8 43.7 
1910 75.8 33.6 14 367.4 33.5 
1911 66.7 63.9 12 673.7 21.1 
1912 152.6  89.1 97.5 657.6 51.5 
[Typesetter: Please align all numbers around decimal point in the table] 
 
Source: Guo Yuqing, Jindai Riben yinhang zai Hua jinrong huodong: Hengbin zhengjin yinhang, 
1894±1919,  p. 195, Table 3-18; YSB total circulation figures in gold-yen terms are derived from 
<RNRKDPDVKǀNLQJLQNǀ]HQVKL, vol. 6, pp. 399±401. In 1909, the Shanghai branch balance-sheet 
switched from Tls. totals to local silver $ totals. Yen and local tael figures have been converted to 
silver dollar terms based on the exchange-rate data in Hsiao Liang-lin, &KLQD¶V)RUHLJQ7UDGH6WDWLVWLFV
1864±1949 (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974),  pp. 190±192; Hosea Ballu 
Morse, The Trade and Administration of China (New York: Russel and Russell, 1921) [Rep. 1967], pp. 
156±173. 
 
In 19WKH<6%¶VWRWDOFLUFXODWLRQYROXPHLQ&KLQD3URSHUDPRXQWHGWRMXVW
million silver dollars, and notes were yet to be issued in the imperial capital of Beijing. 
That the YSB note issuance was still a phenomenon confined mainly to the treaty-
ports of 6KDQJKDLDQG7LDQMLQDQGUHODWLYHO\GLVWDQWIURP&KLQD¶VVHDWRIJRYHUQPHQW
might explain why it had not yet incurred much imperial wrath. As late as 23 May 
1908 the North-China Herald UHSRUWHGWKDWWKHHQIHHEOHG4LQJG\QDVW\¶V7UHDVXU\
(duzhibuµ«KDVnow come to the conclusion that, as foreign bank-notes are not 
                                                                                                                                            
(Beijing: Wenwu, 1992), pp. 27±35; Albert Pick, Standard Catalogue of World Paper Money, vol. I 
(Iola, Wis: Krause Publications, 1990), pp. 285±288. 
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circulated widely in the interior of the various Provinces, [it] will not interfere with 
WKHPDWWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQW¶14 
 
The malaise that struck the Chinese financial market on the eve of the Qing Dynasty 
downfall was in part due to the fact that it had by then become reliant in no small 
measure on foreign endorsement. Yet the spike in the YSB Mainland China 
circulation volumes for 1911±1912 should be placed in a wider context. As late as 21 
October 1911, the North-China Herald opined in an editorial that even at that stage, 
too many Shanghainese refrained from accepting foreign bank notes in lieu of drafts 
issued by near-insolvent Chinese banks:15  
[set quote] 
[S]teps [by foreign banks] are in contemplation to stop this mad rush, and save the native banks from 
impending bankruptcy. It need not be told that if the Chinese even had confidence in the foreign 
banknotes there would be a good deal of relief and the market would have time for readjustment. As it 
happens, there is a heavy load of short loans and native orders for the native banks to pay, and in spite 
of the extension of time granted by the foreign banks they do not see their way to meet obligations if 
WKHUXVKFRQWLQXHV«,WLVVXUSULVLQJWhat the Chinese authorities should have done comparatively little 
WRUHOLHYHWKHLJQRUDQWSHRSOHRIWKHLUDQ[LHW\:HXQGHUVWDQGWKDWDWWKHLQVWDQFHRIWKH%DQNHU¶VJXLOG
the [Governor] is contemplating a proclamation urging upon the people the value of sobriety at this 
moment, and making them understand that the notes of the foreign banks and principal Chinese banks 
are absolutely safe and the rush would not be permitted. [end quote]   
 
Parallel developments are critical to understanding the spread of YSB notes across 
0DQFKXULD$IWHU5XVVLD¶VGHIHDWLQLWVZDUZLWK-DSDQLQWKH<6%ZDVDVNHGWR
convert into its own notes Japanese military coupons nominally worth 15 million yen 
that the Japanese Kanto Army had disbursed in the region. In that way, the Japanese 
government sought to stamp out the use of gold-based Roubles along the South 
Manchuria Railway. Then, in 1916, when the government of Yuan Shikai suspended 
the convertibility of Chinese bank notes, the YSB increased its note issue (of both 
silver and gold denominations) over and above the previous cap, so as to take 
advantage of the collapse of popular trust in Chinese government-backed banks. Thus, 
WKH<6%¶Vtotal circulation volume, as measured in Japanese gold yen, more than 
doubled between 1915 and 1916 from ¥ 7 million to ¥ 18 million. Partly in order to 
allow the YSB to meet the robust demand for its notes through this period, its paid-up 
capital²as stipulated in the charter²was consistently lifted from ¥ 30 million in 
1916 to ¥ 100 million in 1920.16   
 
+RZHYHULQWKH<6%¶VVWDWXUHDVDUHJLRQDOEDQNRILVVXHVXIIHUHGDVHWEDFNE\
WKH7HUDXFKLJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRQRPLQDWHWKH%DQNRI&KRVHQDVLWVSULPDU\
EDQNRILVVXHLQ0DQFKXULDZLWKDYLHZWRZDUGVQDUURZLQJ.RUHD¶VWUDGHGHILcit with 
that region, and towards a future monetary unification of Manchuria and Korea. 
Established in 1907, the Andong [present-day Dandong] branch of the YSB near the 
Korean border was, for example, closed down at the end of 1917, and its operations 
were taken over by the Bank of Chosen, which had been present in the city only since 
6HYHUDORWKHU-DSDQHVHEDQNVWKDWZHUHµPRVWO\FRPPHUFLDO¶FRQWLQXHGWR
WUDQVDFWEXVLQHVVLQ$QGRQJWRR7KH<6%¶VROGVLOYHU-yen and gold-yen notes 
subsequently lost legal-tender status in Manchuria, and were progressively 
                                                 
14
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µUHGHHPHG¶LQIDYRXURI%DQNRI&KRVHQQHZJROG-yen notes.17 Conversely, demand 
for its silver-denominated notes in China Proper continued to rise, to the extent that 
the overall circulation volume remained at around ¥ 20 million until mid 1919.18 
 
In the Chinese port city of Dalian [Dairen, occupied by Japan since 1905], 500 km 
southwest of Andong, it was reported in 1919 that Chinese traditional copper coinage 
µGLVDSSHDUHGIURPFLUFXODWLRQHQWLUHO\¶LQfavour of modern Chinese and Japanese-
issued subsidiary coinage and gold-yen notes. The volume of YSB silver-
denominated yen notes circulating there at the time was estimated to be only 
¥ 100,000. Like elsewhere in the Northeast, the YSB had been authorized to issue 
gold-yen notes in Dalian since 1913, and for that reason was described by the British-
UXQ0DULWLPH&XVWRPVVHUYLFHRI&KLQDDVµinstrumental in the pursuance of the 
ILQDQFLDOSROLF\RIWKH-DSDQHVH*RYHUQPHQW¶+RZHYHUDVLQGLFDWHGDERYHDVSHcial 
Japanese government ordinance was issued on 1 December 1917, whereby YSB gold 
yen notes lost their compulsory circulative power in the Kwantung [Kanto] Leased 
Territory and Railway Zone in South Manchuria, enveloping Dalian, as well as places 
like Andong.19     
 
The Bank of Chosen note issue cannot be meaningfully treated here, not least because 
it was conceptually different to that of the YSB. Not only did the Bank of Chosen not 
issue convertible silver-denominated notes (be they in dollar or yen units), but the 
great bulk of its note circulation remained in Korea too. What is more, since Japan 
VXVSHQGHGWKH\HQ¶VFRQYHUWLELOLW\WRJROGLQWKHZDNHRI:RUOG:DU,DQG
temporarily returned to the international gold standard only in January 1930, the Bank 
of Chosen gold-yen notes were effectively rendered inconvertible during that period, 
whereas the YSB needed to maintain the convertibility of its silver dollar notes in 
China Proper because the latter remained on the silver standard until 1935.20 Primarily 
an exchange bank rather than a bank of issue, the YSB was by contrast more 
concerned with the stability of its notes, rather than its market share. In that sense, 
YSB notes were fundamentally different to those of the Bank of Chosen or the Bank 
RI7DLZDQ¶s (discussed below) because of a different perception of their role within 
the Chinese economy. Internal documents published by the YSB make clear that its 
QRWHVZHUHLQIDFWDµPDQDJHGFXUUHQF\¶GHVLJQHGWRVPRRWKRYHUVHDVRQDOWUDGHIORZV
between Manchuria and China Proper, and that the value of those notes was to be 
regulated by selling or buying drafts using an exchange fund held in Shanghai.21  
 
  
 
Beyond banknote issuance 
                                                 
17
 SOAS, Imperial Maritime Customs [hereafter, IMC] Decennial Reports for 1919-21, p. 63. 
18
 Deng Chengfu , µ5LEHQ+HQJELQ]KHQJMLQ\LQKDQJGXLZRJXRGHMLQURQJTLQOXH¶,[Japan's Yokohama 
Specie Bank and Its Financial Invasion of China] in Beijing liaowang, vol. 6 (1995), pp. 27±64; Mark 
Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar 
Japan, p. 65; Guo Yuqing, Jindai Riben yinhang zai Hua jinrong huodong: Hengbin zhengjin yinhang, 
1894±1919[Pre-war Japanese Banks' Operations in China: the Yokohama Specie Bank, 1894-1919] 
(Beijing : Renmin chubanshe, 2007),  p. 117. 
19
 SOAS, IMC Decennial Reports for 1919-21, Appendix II, p. 84±85. 
20Tamaki  Norio, Japanese Banking: A History, 1859±1959),  pp. 111±168; Mark Metzler, Lever of 
Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan, pp. 199±217; 
Michael Schiltz, -DSDQ¶V0RQH\'RFWRUVDQGWKH*ROG-Yen Bloc, passim. 
21
 6KǀK\ǀQRUHNLVKLEHNLWVXNDQRLFKLVKLU\ǀWRVKLWH, pp. 5±8. 
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,QRUGHUWRIXUWKHUXQGHUVWDQG<6%QRWHFLUFXODWLRQSDWWHUQVWKHEDQN¶VPRQHWDUy 
properties should also be placed in the context of more important business ends. After 
DOODV0LFKDHO6FKLOW]KDVUHFHQWO\VKRZQWKHFUX[RIWKHEDQN¶VDFWLYLW\LQ&KLQD
Proper, like that of its British competitors, revolved around the finance of intra treaty-
port trade and Sino-Japanese trade through the provision of short-term exchange bills, 
DQGDURXQGWKHJUDQWLQJRIµSROLWLFDOORDQV¶WRVXFFHVVLYH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWV22 The 
bank did attract deposits from Chinese clientele in Tianjin (mainly Qing officials prior 
to 1912) but±±DFFRUGLQJWR7DLUD7RPR\XNL¶VLPSRUWDQWVWXG\±±the proceeds of these 
deposits were mostly allocated to foreign PHUFKDQWVUHVLGLQJLQ6KDQJKDL,Q7DLUD¶V
view, YSB China branches as a whole ran a net surplus with the Tokyo head-office in 
those years, in other words, the head-office did not seek to employ all China resources 
ORFDOO\EXWWRµVDFULILFH¶WKHVXUSOXVWKHUHWRIXQG-DSDQ¶VVXEVWDQWLDOLPSRUWVRI
machinery from Europe and America.23 Ishii Kanji similarly has shown that during 
the 1910s the YSB relied heavily on deposits by ethnic Chinese and Indians in 
Shanghai and Bombay, respectively.24  
 
*XR<XTLQJFRPSOHPHQWV7DLUD¶VDQG,VKLL¶VLQFLVLYHDQDO\VHVE\VKRZLQJKRZWKH
YSB China deposit-base had evolved from the ground up. Guo suggests that, whilst 
the Shanghai and Tianjin branches accounted for the great bulk of YSB deposits in 
China Proper (60 per cent on average between 1901 and 1913), well under a fourth of 
its Shanghai deposit-base had been attributable to ethnic Chinese clients before 1900. 
Notably, in its pre-1900 phase, the YSB had not yet set up deposit branches in 
Manchuria. Since the YSB was unable to accept deposits within Japan, the vast 
majority of its deposits at the time were therefore attributable to European (60.4 per 
cent), American (27.3 per cent) and Indian (6.4 per cent) branches. Yet, by 1913, over 
DWKLUGRIWKHEDQN¶VZRUOGZLGHGHSRVLWVZHUHDWWULEXWDEOHWR*UHDWHU&KLQD
(Manchuria alone made up about 9 per cent, and China Proper, 15 per cent), whilst 
previously significant American deposits were declining sharply. In other words, by 
the 1910s, China (and in all probability the Chinese clientele) had become much more 
YLWDOWRWKHEDQN¶VZRUOGZLGHRSHUDWLRQVMXVWZKHQSRSXODUUHVHQWPHQWRYHU-DSDQHVH
expansionism was building up there.25  
 
Table 2 shows the findings of previous studies on the regional make-up of YSB 
deposits. 
 
                                                 
22
 Michael Schiltz, -DSDQ¶V0RQH\'RFWRUVDQGWKH*ROG-Yen Bloc, Chapter 4. 
23
 Taira Tomoyuki, µNihon teikoku shugi seiritsuki, chǌJRNXQLRNHUX<RNRKDPDVKǀNLQJLQNǀ¶, in 
Tǀkyǀ daigaku keizaigaku kenkyǌ. 7DLUD¶VYLHZLVVXSSRUWHGE\:LOOLDP:UD\µJapan¶s big-three 
service enterprises in China, 1896±1936¶, in The Japanese informal empire in China, 1895±1937, 
edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, R. Mark  (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton, 1989), pp. 31±64,  
44±47.  
24
 Ishii .DQMLµ%ULWLVK- -DSDQHVH5LYDOU\LQ7UDGLQJDQG%DQNLQJ¶LQThe History of Anglo-Japanese 
Relations, 1600±2000, vol. 4: Economic and Business Relations; D. K. Lieu, Foreign Investments in 
China (Nanjing: Chinese Government Bureau of Statistics, 1929), p. 86; an illuminating indication of 
the importance of local deposits is provided by D. K. Lieu: µ'HSRVLWVRI&KLQHVHDQGIRUHLJQFXVWRPHUV
especially savings and long term deposits, are invested by [the foreign banks] in [China] or other 
FRXQWULHV«DOWKRXJKZHDUHDEOHWRREWDLQWKHLUFRQGHQVHGEDODQFHVKHHWVIRUDOOEUDQFKHVLWLV
impossible with a few exceptions to secure data concerning their China branches alone. As to the way 
they invest the deposits of their customers, detaiOHGSDUWLFXODUVIRURXUSXUSRVHDUHDOVRXQDYDLODEOH¶ 
25
 Guo Yuqing, Jindai Riben yinhang zai Hua jinrong huodong: Hengbin zhengjin yinhang, 1894-1919, 
pp. 189, 191. 
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Table 2 ± YSB Deposits and Loans vs. Other Banks  
Unit: 10,000 Silver $ 
 
[Typesetter: kindly align all figures in all colums around the decimal 
point] 
Year Shanghai 
Deposits 
YSB 
Shanghai  
Standard 
Loans  
 
(excluding 
µ&KRS 
/RDQV¶ 
YSB 
Shanghai 
µ&KRS
/RDQV¶ 
China 
Proper 
Total  
Deposits 
YSB 
Deposit 
Total  
 
YSB 
Total 
Net 
Profit 
 
Bank of 
Taiwan 
China 
Proper 
Deposits 
7KHµ7D
&KLQJ¶
Imperial 
Bank 
Deposits 
(re-named 
µ%DQNRI
&KLQD¶LQ
1912) 
HSBC  
Deposit 
Total 
 
1906 421.4 395.4 761.8 1,752.7 12,431.4 506.6 44.9 1,466.7 19,920 
1907 364.0 313.8 406.1 1,482.3 12,350.7 416.4 74 3,066.7 22,410 
1908 463.2 137.5 7.2 1,617.0 9,885.3 395.8 127.3 4,897.2 29,860 
1909 517.1 129.3 700.2 1,340.6 11,882.1 377.8 111 6,779.2 27,240 
1910 650.1 193.6 2.9 1,467.3 10,225.8 361.7 96 7,501.4 26,410 
1911 842.4 317.6 220.0 1,775.9 11,972.2 396.5 304.3 8,201.4 29,830 
1912 891.7 468.4 0.0 2,117.9 15,992.6 446.8 532.9 313.1 38,840 
1913 1,237.1 606.7 0.0 2,627.7 17,834.3 412.8 637.6 2,620.6 29,820 
 
Source: Taira Tomoyuki, µNihon teikoku shugi seiritsuki, chǌJRNXQLRNHUX<RNRKDPDVKǀNLQJLMNǀ¶,[5 
already translated above] p. 69, Table 2, p. 71 Table 3; YSB Deposit Total and Profits²from 
Yokohama shǀkin ginkǀ zenshi,[5 already translated above] vol. 6, p. 398, Table I; Bank of Taiwan, Ta 
Ching and HSBC data²from Guo Yuqing, Jindai Riben yinhang zai Hua jinrong huodong: Hengbin 
zhengjin yinhang, 1894±1919[5already translated above]  p. 190, Table 3-14. Silver $-Yen exchange 
rate²extracted from Hsiao Liang-lin, &KLQD¶V)RUHLJQ7UDGH6WDWLVWLFV±1949, pp. 190±192; 
Hosea Ballu Morse, The Trade and Administration of China , pp. 156±173. 
 
7DEOHFOHDUO\VKRZVWKDWWKH<6%¶V6KDQJKDLGHSRVLW-base considerably exceeded 
standard loans between 1906 and 1913. However, until 1910 the YSB, like many of 
the foreign bankVLQ6KDQJKDLDOVRDGYDQFHGDVXEVWDQWLDODPRXQWLQXQVHFXUHGµFKRS
ORDQV¶WRORFDOPRQH\VKRSVWKHQNQRZQWRWKH&KLQHVHDVqianzhuang 𨕫牜, and to 
:HVWHUQHUVDVµQDWLYHEDQNV¶)RUWKHPRVWSDUWWKHFRPELQHGYDOXHRIµFKRS¶DQG
standard loans exceeded the value of deposits in the Shanghai branch prior to 1910, 
WKH\HDULQZKLFKPDQ\RIWKHFLW\¶VPRQH\VKRSVEHFDPHLQVROYHQW26 The gap 
between such liabilities and assets was narrowed down²perhaps strategically²by 
the issue of notes in Shanghai. Note-bearers could, for example, be depositors who 
KDGSOHGJHGVSHFLHRYHUWKHFRXQWHURFFDVLRQDOO\ZLWKGUDZLQJµFDVK¶IURPWKHLU
current accounts in the form of notes. The fiduciary portion of the specie 
corresponding with the note value, could then be on-lent by the bank at higher interest 
(the notes themselves did not bear any interest).  
 
Equally important, Table 2 shows that in terms of its ability to attract deposits 
worldwide, the YSB did not fall much behind HSBC in the early twentieth century, 
                                                 
26
 2QWKHµFKRSORDQ¶DQGWKH-12 financial crisis in Shanghai²see Andrea Lee McElderry, 
Shanghai Old- VW\OH%DQNV&K¶LHQ- Chuang), 1800±1925: A Traditional Institution in a Changing 
Society (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976); Nishimura Shizuya, 
µ7KH)RUHLJQDQG1DWLYH%DQNVLQ&KLQD&KRS/RDQVLQ6KDQJKDLDQG+DQNRZEHIRUH¶LQ
Modern Asian Studies , vol. 39, issue 1 (2005), pp. 109±132. 
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even though the latter had been established earlier, and was formally endorsed by the 
British colonial establishment in East Asia. Conversely, the Bank of Taiwan, which 
also attracted deposits in Mainland China (mainly in Xiamen), was no match for the 
YSB there.  
 
But one of the first Chinese-run modern financial institutions, the Ta Ching Imperial 
Bank (C. Daqing yinhang 絡《蝲が, to be re-QDPHGWKHµ%DQNRI&KLQD¶DIWHU
could by 1907 outpace the YSB in terms of deposit mobilization in China. Ta Ching 
seems to have scUDSHGWKURXJKWKHWXUPRLOLQ6KDQJKDL¶VGRPHVWLFILQDQFLDOVHFWRULQ
1910. However, the result was that much of its deposit-base was later withdrawn as a 
consequence of its association with the moribund Qing dynasty.27 
  
 
Anti-foreign boycotts  
 
Quite apart from the financial crisis that befell Japan in early 1919, the May Fourth 
0RYHPHQWDXJXUHGWURXEOHIRUWKH<6%¶VQRWHLVVXHLQ&KLQD3URSHUODWHUWKDW\HDU
Although not the first popular boycott directed against Japanese imports to China, the 
Wusi boycott of 1919 was certainly the first whereby Japanese bank notes were 
poignantly targeted, ushering in similar waves of effective agitation throughout the 
VDQGV(YHQWKRXJKQRPLQDOO\WKH<6%¶V&KLQDQRWHLVVXHSUHYDLOHGD
few years beyond 1935²the historic juncture at which the Kuomintang 
[KMT][3]government proclaimed its fabi FXUUHQF\DV&KLQD¶VVROHOHJDOWHQGHU²its 
circulation volumes would never again reach the late-1918 peak. Yet despite its 
formative role in shaping Chinese socio-political consciousness, economic research 
into the May Fourth Movement primarily deals with its effects on Sino-Foreign trade, 
QHJOHFWLQJWKHER\FRWW¶VHIIHFWVRQWKHORFDORSHUDWLRQVRIIRUHLJQ-run banks and 
multinationals. 
 
Western financial institutions operating in China were beset by numerous crises 
through much of the same period. Upon the outbreak of World War I, the Allies 
forced the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank branches in China to shut down. These branches 
were barely able to resume operation in 1918. Crises in the foreign banking sector 
persisted after the war. The Russo-Asiatic Bank was arguably the first foreign 
financial institution to be targeted by boycotts. It was nominally a Sino-Russian joint 
venture, but effectively a French-owned firm that had to be reconstituted in the wake 
of the Bolshevik Revolution, and which ultimately failed in 1925.28  
 
The Asiatic Banking Corporation, a Sino-American joint venture, had come to the 
brink of failure in 1924, and was eventually sold off to the International Banking 
Corporation. The Chinese-American Bank of Commerce, another American joint 
venture, suspended business in 1928. Based in Tianjin, the Sino-Scandinavian Bank 
(established 1921) suffered a severe run on its notes in 1928 and closed its business 
shortly thereafter. But, arguably, the failure most inimical to the reputation of foreign 
                                                 
27
 On the Ta Ching Bank²see Kong Xiangxia, Daqing yinhang hangshi[A History of the Ta Ching 
Bank] (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1991).  
28
 R. K. I. Quested, The Russo-Chinese Bank: a Multinational Financial Base of Tsarism in China 
(Birmingham University Press, 1977); on late-Qing attempts at stemming the spread of Russian 
banknotes in Manchuria, see, for example, Stephen A. Smith, Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and 
Labor in Shanghai, 1895±1927  (Duke University Press, 2002),  p. 45. 
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financial institutions in China occurred in 1921. This was when the Banque 
Industrielle de Chine had to suspend the convertibility of its Shanghai notes into silver 
due to overprinting. At the last moment, Chinese banks came to its rescue and 
redeemed the notes.29 
 
Anti-foreign boycotts proved equally if not more inimical to the interests of British 
firms operating in China in the mid-1920s, and is probably the reason why the 
performance of these firms is covered more widely than Japanese firms in pertinent 
academic literature.30 Yet almost all the Chinese popular ire came to bear on Japan in 
1919. It is therefore critical to unearth the Japanese perspective on the events 
unfolding at the time. 7DNDWVXQD+LURIXPL¶VUHFHQWFRPSUHKHQVLYHVWXG\KLJKOLJKWV
WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK&KLQHVHODERXUHUV¶DJLWDWLRQLQWKH1DJDL:DWDFRWWRQILODWXUHV
disquieted the Japanese expatriate community in pre-war Shanghai, but it does not 
address the activities of the YSB at all. Neither does Guo <XTLQJ¶VDIRUHPHQWLRQHG
study of the YSB go beyond 1919, thereby eliding the implications of the May Fourth 
Movement.31 Similarly, Kikuchi Takaharu briefly mentions in his classic study of 
Chinese nationalism that Chinese clients had withdrawn deposits from Japanese banks 
LQEXWLVRWKHUZLVHPXFKPRUHSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKWKH0D\)RXUWK0RYHPHQW¶V
effects on the sale of Japanese imported goods.32 
 
Japanese intelligence reports from Shanghai do nonetheless attest at length to the 
sheer anxiety with which expatriate Japanese financiers and bankers²not just 
industrialists²viewed the mounting agitation against Japan as of 1919. As part of this 
agitation, not only were Japanese imported goods boycotted in the 1920s, but often 
Chinese-run moneyshops and modern banks refused to honour IOUs or notes 
presented by Japanese firms for encashment.33   
 
Although there are numerous intelligence reports detailing such events in the mid-
1920s, there are also similar primary materials attesting to the incipient alarm that 
seeped through the Japanese expatriate community during the formative 1919 boycott. 
For example, the commercial gazette (7VǌVKǀ kǀhǀ㵤淡梧乏), which was published 
by the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimushǀ), frequently alluded in its 1919 issues to 
not only a downturn in the sales of Japanese goods like toothpaste or tyres in the 
Chinese market, but also to runs on the YSB and Bank of Chosen branches in places 
as far-away from Shanghai as Changchun or Zhifu (Yantai).34 Likewise, consular 
reports now held at the Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records suggest that 
                                                 
29
 Frank Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), pp. 
28±30; Ding Richu, Shanghai jindai jingji shi, vol. II (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), 
pp. 67±68, 101; Noel H. Pugach, Same Bed, Different Dreams: A History of the Chinese American 
Bank of Commerce, 1919±1937  (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, Hong Kong University, 1997).  
30
 Sherman Cochran, Big Business in China: Sino- Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry,1890±
1930 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
31
 Takatsuna Hirofumi, Kokusai tǀVKLVKDQKDLQRQDNDQR1LKRQMLQ [Japanese Expatriates in 
Cosmopolitan Shanghai] (Tokyo: Kenbun, 2009); Guo Yuqing, Jindai Riben yinhang zai Hua jinrong 
huodong: Hengbin zhengjin yinhang, 1894±1919; C. F. Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts: With 
Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1933). 
32
 Kikuchi Takaharu, Chǌgoku minzoku undo no kihon kozo [The Basic Structure of Chinese 
Nationalist Movements](Tokyo: Daian, 1996), p. 182. 
33
 6DQWǀ shuppei WRKDLQLNNDXQGǀ [The Shandong Expedition and Anti-Japanese Boycott] (Shanghai: 
Shanhai NihRQ6KǀJ\R kaigisho, 1927).  
34
 7VǌVKǀ kǀhǀ issues for 16 June 1919 (Changchun); 17 July 1919 (Zhifu). 
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Japanese colonial policy-makers were concerned about the implications of the 1919 
boycott of Japanese banks in places like Qingdao, close to their sphere of influence in 
the Northeast.35  
 
Professor Edmund S. K. Fung has insightfully described the wave of Chinese popular 
agitation directed against the British during the mid-1920s as the driving force behind 
the most effective boycott ever carried out by the Chinese against foreigners; this 
DJLWDWLRQVSDUNHGDUHDFWLRQLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKZKLFKµ«WKHDQWL-Japanese boycott of 
1919±SDOHVLQWRLQVLJQLILFDQFH¶36 Professor )XQJ¶VREVHUYDWLRQLVRIYDOXH
precisely because the May Fourth Movement, unleashed on the heels of the Versailles 
Peace Conference and Japanese territorial encroachments in Shandong, has 
commanded far greater attention from cultural and social historians than from 
economic historians.37 Certainly, insofar as the circulation of Japanese banknotes in 
China is concerned, both periods remain critically under-studied. A closer look at the 
YSB indices for 1919 might suggest, however, that the impact of the Wusi boycott on 
Japanese banks was far from trivial.  
 
2Q0D\6KDQJKDL¶VPRQH\VKRSJXLOGDQQRXQFHGWKDWLWVPHPEHUVZHUHWR
halt the clearing of quasi-foreign notes issued by Japanese banks, even though 
alternative reliable Chinese paper money was hard to find at the time.38 At that 
moment, however, the epicentre of anti-Japanese agitation had largely been confined 
to North China. Japanese reports recount that Chinese student activists had 
campaigned there for the boycott of Japanese goods, particularly in Beijing and 
Tianjin. However, silver dollar notes issued in Shanghai by the YSB and, to a much 
lesser extent, the Bank of Taiwan, were a highly visible manifestation of Japanese 
penetration, and subsequently became one of the most pronounced targets for 
agitation by mid-May 1919.39   
 
                                                 
35
 Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records, intelligence report dated 20 November 1919, Reel no. 1-
0517, folio 0273. On the longer-term Japanese mercantile anxiety that the May Fourth boycott 
unleashed, see also Banno Junji, µ-DSDQHVH,QGXVWULDOLVWVDQG0HUFKDQWVDQGWKH$QWL-Japanese 
Boycotts in China, 1919±¶in The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895±1937, edited by 
Duus, Peter, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1989), pp. 314±317. However, Banno does not discuss the impact of boycotts specifically on banking. 
36
 Edmund S. K. Fung, 7KH'LSORPDF\RI,PSHULDO5HWUHDW%ULWDLQ¶V6RXWK&KLQD3ROLF\±1931 
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 44. 
37
 Rinbara Fumiko, 6ǀ6RNN\ǌWR7HQVKLQQRNRNNDWHLVKǀXQGǀ [Song Zejiu and the Origins of the 
Tianjin Movement for the Promotion of Chinese Goods ](Kyoto: 'ǀKǀVKD), p. 47. 5LQEDUD¶V
case-study well illustrates the failure to address boycotts of quasi-foreign banknotes as one of the most 
significant characteristics of anti-foreign agitation between 1919-1927. Rinbara cursorily describes 
how students in Tianjin had tried to force merchants to encash Japanese-issued notes in 1919, but like 
other scholars does not analyse the consequences for Japanese banks in the city. Notably, the first 
boycott against quasi-foreign banknotes in Tianjin had actually targeted the French-run Banque 
Industrielle de Chine as early as 1916. See Brett Sheehan, Trust in Troubled Times: Money, Banks and 
State-Society Relations in Republican Tianjin (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2003), p. 82. 
38
 See Wusi yundong zai Shanghai shiliao xuanji [Select Historical Materials on the May Fourth 
Movement in Shanghai](Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1961), pp. 11, 215. 
39
 Ren Jianshu, Xiandai Shanghai da shiji [A Chronicle of Modern Shanghai](Shanghai: Shanghai 
cishu chubanshe, 1996), pp. 11±16; Wusi yundong zai Shanghai shiliao xuanji, pp. 212±213, 689±692. 
2Q7DLZDQ¶VFRORQLDOHFRQRP\²see Samuel P. S. Ho, Development of Taiwan 1860±1970 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), Chapter 3. 
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The overall impact of the 1919 boycott of Japanese-issued notes in China Proper can 
be inferred from YSB balance-sheet totals as shown in Table 3 below in pounds-
sterling terms. The unit of account is of importance here because, as indicated above, 
YSB notes were actually denominated in a raft of fairly arcane local Chinese tael and 
silver-dollar denominations, as well as in gold yen denominations.  
 
The YSB was conveying this information in English to an international readership 
beyond East Asia. In other words, this information was purposefully converted into a 
familiar unit of account, and would have been widely available to political and 
financial analysts, even though none seem to have publicly acknowledged nationalist 
sentiments with banknote circulation volumes at the time.   
 
Table 3 
Yokohama Specie Bank Select Midyear Balance-Sheet Entries, 1915±1923 
8QLW*%3ǧPLOOLRQ 
[Typesetter: kindly align numbers around decimal point in all columns] 
 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 
Notes in Circulation  0.6 1.0 2.3 2.1 1.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.3 
Cash Reserves  2.2 2.4 3.3 4.2 4.1 4.5 3.5 3.6 2.7 
Deposits 16.3 25.0 33.7 66.0 53.5 56.4 50.1 50.6 47.9 
Balance Sheet Total 32.4 42.5 64.3 115.9 124.9 139.0 101.9 99.7 109.3 
Source:  %DQNHUV¶0DJD]LQH 1916±1924. 
 
 
Unlike the Bank of Taiwan or the Bank of Chosen, the YSB was an overseas bank 
whose note issue at the time was predicated on demand in areas beyond formal 
-DSDQHVHGRPLQDWLRQ&KLQD¶V1RUWKHDVW7LDQMLQDQG6KDQJKDL,WLVWKHUHIRUH
particularly instructive to note that its total circulation volume in pounds-sterling 
terms had peaked in 1917; it had dropped by no less than 66.6 per cent by mid-1920, 
and waned further between 1922±1923. The 1919 setback was much less pronounced 
when confined to YSB total deposits²those fell by just 28 per cent between the 1918 
peak and 1923. The anti-Japanese climate in China is still less traceable in balance-
VKHHWWRWDOVZKLFKXOWLPDWHO\UHIOHFWHG-DSDQ¶VWUDGHYROXPHZLWKWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG
Here, an increase of 11 per cent was recorded in fact between 1919±1920. The stark 
variance between these different balance-sheet entries suggests World War I and the 
RQVHWRI-DSDQ¶VRZQILQDQFLDOFULVLVLQHDUO\ZHUHQRWWKHRQO\IDFWRUVDWSOD\LQ
H[SODLQLQJWKH<6%¶VSHUIRUPDQFH 
 
Crucially, China-based British bank figures are indicative of similar dynamics. As the 
first foreign financial institutions to set up shop in China in the mid nineteenth century, 
British banks were also the first to issue banknotes. The comparative reliability of 
British banks in Shanghai turned them, from the 1870s, into one of the lynchpins of 
the expatriate community in this increasingly vital treaty-port. British financial 
institutions in Shanghai were preponderant in the local stock exchange, and stalwarts 
like the Oriental Bank Corporation, the HSBC and the Chartered Bank not only 
funnelled a large share of the total foreign investment in the country, but also issued a 
FRQVLGHUDEOHVKDUHRIWKHFLW\¶VILGXFLDU\-money supply. Ultimately, these banks were 
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LQGLVSHQVLEOHWR%ULWDLQ¶VLQIRUPDOHPSLUHLQ(DVW$VLDDQGWRFDWDO\VLQJWKH
monetary reform of Imperial China.40 
 
Yet anti-British sentiments infused Chinese student agitation in 1925±1926, as a result 
of grievances against the brutality of the British-run Shanghai Municipal Police. 
These sentiments adversely affected note circulation volumes more than any other 
balance-sheet entry; British bank fixed-deposit receipts were only temporarily 
DIIHFWHGE\VWXGHQWDFWLYLVWV¶FDOOVRQDOO&KLQHVHWRZLWKGUDZIXQGVIURP%ULWLVK
banks. It would appear that, in at least one sense, the anti-Japanese student agitation 
of 1919 produced a longer-term result in the YSB case than in the 1925 British case. 
After 1919, several contemporary observers noted that the YSB issue in Shanghai had 
in effect been wiped out by nationalist campaigns.41 In contrast, the British-run 
&KDUWHUHG%DQN¶Vtotal note circulation volumes in China recovered swiftly after the 
1925 setback, whilst HSBC decided to scale down its China note issue despite a 
resurgent demand in fear of future boycotts.42  
 
The difference in the durability of the boycott in either case may have stemmed from 
the turnaround in British policy after 1927²from confronting to appeasing Chinese 
nationalists²as opposed to intensifying Japanese aggression and concomitant 
Chinese mobilization against Japanese banks in Shanghai.43 Chinese boycotts proved 
particularly thorny when directed at one power at a time. Since the early twentieth 
century, Chinese campaigners had improved their ability to identify cracks in each 
SRZHUV¶&KLQDSROLFLHV$WWKHKHLJKWRIWKHDnti-Japanese wave, the Western 
expatriate community largely distanced itself from the fray. But in 1925, the 
campaigners so adroitly manoeuvred Britain into the dock that British expatriates in 
Shanghai came to believe a Bolshevist conspiracy was afoot to single them out from 
the French and Japanese.44    
 
At the same time, student-led anti-foreign campaigns in 1919 and 1925±1926 made 
the Chinese press turn its attention to foreign bank note issuance as an internationally 
anomalous monetary phenomenon that must be redressed if China were to rehabilitate 
the flagging reputation of its financial institutions, and achieve respect amongst the 
nations of the world. Calls on successive Republican Chinese governments to suspend 
foreign bank privileges began to be heard from 1919, and articles lamenting the 
considerable discount which Chinese banknotes incurred in the marketplace were not 
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 A. S. J. Baster, The International Banks (New York: Amo Press, 1935) [Rep. 1977]; Clarence B. 
Davis, µ)LQDQFLQJ,PSHULDOLVP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China, 1908±¶LQ Business History Review, vol. 56.2 (1982), pp. 236±264. 
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*DLPXVKǀTVǌVKǀN\RNX1924), p. 131; Dorothy J. Orchard, µ&KLQD¶V8VHRIWKH%R\FRWWDVD
3ROLWLFDO:HDSRQ¶, in the Annalsof the American Academy of Political and Social Science² China, vol. 
152 (1930), pp. 252±254; cf. Pan Liangui, Shanghai huobi shi [The History of Shanghai's 
Currencies](Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2004), p. 130. 
42
 Niv Horesh, 6KDQJKDL¶V Bund and Beyond: British Banks, Banknote Issuance and Monetary Policy 
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uncommon.45     
 
Because of its macro-level and rather apolitical approach, there is hardly any mention 
of the effects of these anti--DSDQHVHER\FRWWVRQWKH<6%¶V&KLQDRSHUDWLRQVLQLWVVL[-
volume official history, released in 1980±1984. Rather, this official history 
laconically refers to note forgeries as a factor adversely affecting circulation in inland 
commercial hubs like Hankou in 1922, as well as to local incidents that are deprived a 
nationwide political context.46 Be that as it may, one of these laconic references cites 
in passing an internal YSB memorandum of 1 March 1936, written shortly after the 
promulgation of the fabi legal-tender and the roll-back of foreign bank notes in China. 
This retrospective memorandum confirmed that the YSB Shanghai issue was valued 
at 2 million silver dollars at its height, or just under 0.5 million higher than the figure 
available for mid-1912 (see Table 1 above).47  
 
Total YSB note circulation for mid-1917 peaked in pounds-VWHUOLQJWHUPVDWǧ
million (see Table 3 above), arguably as a result of a growing demand in Shanghai. 
&RQVLGHULQJWKDWE\RYHUKDOIWKH<6%¶VQRWHFLUFXODWLRQFRXOGEHDWWULEXWHGWR
demand in China Proper²quite plausibly related to the 9 per cent drop in the mid-
1918  bullion price fluctuations (recall that YSB notes were disbursed in both gold 
and silver-denominated units of account whilst the pounds-sterling was purely on gold 
at the time). On the other hand, the much bigger mid-year drop recorded in 1920 (24 
per cent) was, in view of the qualitative evidence presented above, almost certainly 
related to the surge in anti-Japanese sentiments in China Proper.       
 
In yen terms, broader trends can be observed based on a different year-end data-set 
that was compiled ex post. Overall, YSB banknote volumes clearly took off on the eve 
RIWKH4LQJG\QDVW\¶VGRZQIDOOLQ7KLVWDNH-off, however, dramatically 
accelerated through the ensuing political instability of the early warlord era in China. 
AWSOD\GXULQJWKLVSHULRGZHUHSHUKDSVQRWRQO\SRSXODUPLVWUXVWRI<XDQ6KLNDL¶V
interventionist bank reforms (1916), but also concerns about the solvency of Western 
banks of issue during World War I.48 Circulation volumes had started dropping 
around 1917-DWILUVWSUREDEO\DVDUHVXOWRI<6%¶VORVVRIQRWH-issue exclusivity 
in Manchuria. Thereafter, successive waves of anti-Japanese boycotts in China (1919, 
1923, 1925, and 1932) seem to have taken their toll on total circulation volumes with 
partial recovery in the interim.49 
 
Notably, there is one difference between the datasets: in yen terms no dip was 
recorded in December 1917. Rather, circulation peaked in December 1918 
(¥ 22,603,000). Whether this mismatch between the yen and the pounds-sterling data-
sets is purely a result of exchange-rate vagaries or perhaps a time lag, the long term 
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impact of anti-Japanese boycotts on circulation volumes forcefully emerges from both 
data-sets. The yen circulation figure for December 1919 (¥ 15,154,000) is no less than 
33 per cent lower on the previous year; the December 1920 figure (¥ 7,543,000) is 
more precipitously lower (67 per cent) compared with December 1918.  
 
 Can the boycott effect be isolated ? 
 
 
Unless additional in-house correspondence is discovered, it would be almost 
impossible to seamlessly disentangle the boycott effect from other factors at play.50 
Quoted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the YSB share price during 1919 can 
nevertheless serve as a rough guide to the problematic at stake. The 12-month share 
price average during 1916 was ¥ 231, fairly stably climbing to ¥ 268 by December 
1918. By September 1919, the share price peaked at ¥ 360. Prior to 1919 there had 
been no dramatic price swings recorded between September and October, yet in 
October 1919 the share price plummeted by 32 per cent, reaching as low as ¥ 220 by 
November, and then curiously re-bouncing back up to ¥ 304 in December. However, 
the share was to trade at an average below ¥ 200 until the mid-1920s.51 At face value, 
the drop of nearly 40 per cent in the share price between September and December 
1919 would dovetail fairly well with the known progression of the May Fourth 
Movement, but it would be absolutely wrong to jump to conclusions because of the 
subsequent protracted trough which suggests other recessionary factors were at play.     
 
The world price of silver, which was in decline after 1919, may have conceivably 
DIIHFWHGWKH<6%¶V7RN\RVKDUHSULFHWRVRPHH[WHQWDVWKHEDQNKDGVXEVWDQWLDO
operations in silver-standard China. But, more fundamentally, the post World War I 
slump in East Asia is likely to have engendered the share price trough thereafter.52 So 
how big an impact did the 1919 anti-Japanese boycott have in the larger scheme of 
things? If there was not much impact on YSB deposits, can the May Fourth boycott 
alone account for the drop in banknote circulation volumes? In the absence of in-
house YSB correspondence, part of the answer might rise from the pages of the 
North-China Herald.   
 
Twenty days after the May Fourth Movement was unleashed in Beijing, the North-
China Herald UHSRUWHGIURP6KDQJKDLWKDWWKHER\FRWWKDGEHHQµLQFUHDVLQJLQ
HIILFLHQF\¶DQGWKDWµWKHUHIXVDOWRDFFHSW-DSDQHVHQRWHVLVQRZEHLQJPXOWLSOLHGLQ
PDQ\ZD\V¶ZLWKPDQ\FDOOLQJRQ-DSDQHVHEDQNEUDQFKHs with the purpose of 
FRQYHUWLQJQRWHVLQWRVLOYHU$QRWKHUDUWLFOHLQWKHVDPHLVVXHGLYXOJHGWKDWµ«>i]n 
quite a number of shops there now appear notices that Japanese banknotes will not 
be taken, while even where these notices are not supplied there is an almost 
XQDQLPRXVUHOXFWDQFHWRDFFHSWWKHQRWHV¶53 
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 0DQ\RIWKH<6%¶VUHFRUGVZHUHWUDQVIHUUHGWR:DVKLQgton DC during the American occupation of 
Japan.These include, among other valuable items, the YSB in-house monetary surveys but apparently 
little by way of internal branch correspondence.  
 
 
51
 Share price data compiled from 0HLMLWDLVKǀNRNXVHLVǀUDQ[An Overview of Meiji and Taisho-era 
Official Statistics] (Tokyo: Tǀ\ǀ keizai shimposha, 1975), p. 315. 
52
 Peter Boomgaard, ,DQ%URZQµAn Introduction¶, in The Economies of Southeast Asia in the 1930s 
depression  (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 1±19. 
53
 NCH, 24 May 1919 pp. 507, 598. 
17 
 
 
Anti-Japanese sentiments did not dissipate soon enough, illustrated by the fact that on 
31 January 1920 an expatriate North-China Herald reader surnamed Zadoc sent the 
newspaper a complaint to that effHFW3XEOLVKHGRQ)HEUXDU\=DGRF¶V
Shanghai observations read:54 
[set quote] 
«>7@KH&KLQHVHDUHXVLQJWKHEDQNQRWHVRIWKH+RQJNRQJ	6KDQJKDL%DQNWRSURPRWHWKHLUDQWL-
-DSDQHVHSURSDJDQGDE\VWDPSLQJWKHPRQERWKVLGHVLQ(QJOLVKDQG&KLQHVHµ%R\Fott Japanese 
*RRGV¶,IVXFKVWDPSHGQRWHVZHUHUHIXVHGRURQO\WDNHQDWDGLVFRXQWLWZRXOGVRRQSXWDVWRSWRVR
impertinent and illegal a proceeding.[end  quote] 
 
<HWWKHVHUHSRUWVVKRXOGEHUHDGZLWKWKHRQVHWRI-DSDQ¶V±1920 financial crisis 
and the protracted recession thereafter in mind. In fact, runs on Japanese banks began 
well before May Fourth. As early as 4 January 1919, the North-China Herald reported 
on the rumoured imminent failures of Japanese banks milling about in Osaka, 
precipitatiQJDµPLOGUXQ¶RQ-DSDQHVHEDQNVLQ6KDQJKDL55 
[set quote] 
Local Japanese banks experienced runs on Monday, Chinese holders of their notes having become 
distrustful because of reports of bankruptcy and failure of various firms in Osaka. In the afternoon there 
was a steady stream of callers at the Bank of Taiwan, [with] holders of small amounts in notes 
demanding silver. After three o'clock, the usual closing hour, a line was formed on the pavement and 
the bank continued to pay out until four o'clock. The crowd was not in the least excited and apparently 
the bank experienced no difficulty in meeting the sudden call for silver, the manager [suggesting] to a 
representative of this paper that his vaults contained sufficient coin to meet the notes in local 
circulation. The Yokohama Specie Bank also found an unusual number of notes being handed in for 
silver coin, and although the amounts exchanged at this bank were individually larger, there were fewer 
applicants. Appreciating that the nervousness of the Chinese public might well be extended over to the 
next morning, and that the run might assume large proportions, the Yokohama Specie on Monday 
evening decided, if the step seemed necessary in order to restore confidence, next morning to place in 
the hands of all Chinese banks that are members of the bankers' guild sums of hard coin with 
instructions to pay out immediately on any Yokohama Specie notes that might be presented.[end  quote] 
 
As indicated above, from 1920 right up to the formal banning of foreign bank notes in 
China Proper by the KMT[3] government (1936) a series of less pronounced note 
circulation troughs and peaks could be observed in Shanghai. Total YSB note 
circulation partially rebounded around 1928 and 1931 but never caught up with the 
1918 peak. Though I have not found lateral evidence in the YSB records to prove this 
beyond doubt, it is reasonable to assume that the 1928 and 1931 partial rebound might 
DOVREHOLQNHGWRWKHFRQFXUUHQWZLWKGUDZDORI+6%&¶V&KLQDLVVXHRUWRWKHIDLOXUH
of smaller foreign banks during that period, rather than purely as a result of any 
SXWDWLYHGRZQZDUGGHPDQGSUHVVXUHVLQWKH1RUWKHDVWZKHUHWKHEDQN¶VVWDQGLQJKDG
by then greatly diminished.56  
 
It is instructive, at any rate, to use the YSB circulation figures as a bellwether for the 
geo-politics of the Sino-Foreign encounter, and for the variation in economic 
conditions across Greater China. But the vitality of this note issue per se WRWKH<6%¶V
worldwide operations in the 1920s should not be grossly overstated. This is because 
                                                 
54
 NCH, 7 February 1920, p. 374. 
55
 NCH, 4 January 1919, p. 30. 0RQGD\¶VUXQRQWKH%DQNRI7DLZDQZDVWKRXJKWWRKDYHUHVXOWHGLQ
µOHVVWKDQRILWVQRWHV¶DQGDERXWKDOIWKHDPRXQWLQ<6%VLOYHUGROODUQRWHVFDVKHG 
 
56
 Niv Horesh, 6KDQJKDL¶V%XQGDQG%H\RQG%ULWLVK%DQNV%DQNQRWH,VVXDQFHDQG0RQHWDU\3ROLF\
in China, 1842±1937, Chapter 4. 
18 
 
even at its peak in 1918 the total note issue did not make up more than 4.2 per cent of 
WKHEDQN¶VWRWDOGHSRVLWVDQGHPERGLHGDVPDOOHUIUDFWLRQRIWKHEDODQFH-sheet 
bottom line. Rather, the diminution in note circulation should be seen as compounding 
WKHHIIHFWVRI-DSDQ¶VGRPHVWLFUHFHVVLRQRQLWVFRORQLDOEDQNVLQWKHV$OVR
VPDOOHUFLUFXODWLRQYROXPHVRYHUVHDVSUREDEO\PHDQWOHVVDELOLW\WRRIIVHW-DSDQ¶V
current-account deficit at the time with a surplus of silver specie holdings in China.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
7KLVSDSHUDLPHGWRSURYLGHDGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKH<6%¶VEDQNQRWHLVVXDQFHZKLOH
stressing that it was moulded in the image of HSBC, not least regarding the provisions 
of metallic reserve in its charter. Like HSBC, it was a publically-listed exchange 
bank, in the first instance, rather than a dedicated colonial bank of issue. Within this 
framework, three critical developments can be traced over the course of the pre-war 
HUDGHPDQGIRUWKHEDQN¶VQRWHVLQ&KLQD3URSHUILUVt shot up as a result of the 
breakdown of the Qing dynastic reign in 1912 and the attendant financial crisis in 
Shanghai; by 1917, YSB banknotes lost their legal-tender status in Manchuria due to 
important shifts in Japanese colonial policy, but this development was offset by 
higher circulation volumes in China Proper until late 1918; the YSB circulation 
volumes had started to fall from the absolute late-SHDNZLWKWKHRQVHWRI-DSDQ¶V
post-war recession in early 1919, but more dramatically (and irreversibly) dropped 
later that year as a result of the Wusi anti-Japanese agitation. 
 
YSB banknotes in China were designed rom their inception to support more important 
business objectives like the amassing of local deposits and the facilitation of trade 
between Manchuria and China Proper. There is no evidence to suggest that the notes 
were ever conceived as the future currency of a Japanese-dominated China amongst 
7RN\R¶VµHPSLUH-EXLOGHUV¶8OWLPDWHO\WKHUHIRUHWKH<6%EDQNQRWHLVVXDQFHLQ&KLQD
Proper proved to be limited, both in terms of its share of total YSB liabilities and of 
its volume compared with Chinese, foreign and other Japanese banks that disbursed 
notes in Greater China. Yet, the available data would suggest that, beginning in mid-
1919,  the YSB notes came under more sustained pressure on the part of Chinese 
nationalists than British banks were to experience six years later. 
 
7KHKLVWRULFVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKH<6%¶VEDQNQRWHLVVXDQFHLQ&KLQD3URSHUWKHUHIRUH
lies in its amplifying of important and concrete permutations in Japanese colonial 
policy; in its parsing of the degree of Sino-Japanese resistance to Western imperialism 
in the economic sphere; and in its foregrounding of regulatory commonalities as well 
as competitive thrusts within the broader sweep of the Sino-Foreign encounter from 
the era of High Imperialism right through to the Pacific War. In essence, what the 
YSB was doing in Shanghai until the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 does not 
look significantly different²at least in terms of banknote issuance²to how recent 
studies have portrayed the Shanghai operations of the British-run HSBC or Chartered 
Bank. Put otherwise, this paper underlines an important point for students of modern 
-DSDQZHVKRXOGQRWOHW-DSDQ¶VSRVW-1937 unbridled militarism entirely over-script 
the nuanced patterns of international monetary rivalry and co-adaptation before the 
war. By the same token, it remains the job of historians to help elucidate the complex 
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patterns of contemporary Sino-Japanese rivalry with more meaningful pre-war 
context. 
 
 
